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F
or many years, the Federal Reserves dis-
count window has played an important
role in monetary policy. Discount window
borrowing helps individual depository institu-
tions manage their reserve accounts in the pres-
ence of unexpected deposit and payments flows.
Improved reserve management, in turn, helps
stabilize the overnight federal funds market by
reducing the volatility of short-term interest
rates.Moreover,announcedchangesintheFed-
eralReservesdiscountratehaveoftensignaled
important shifts in the stance of monetary policy
and have frequently been associated with large
changes in market interest rates, exchange rates,
and asset prices.
In the 1990s, however, the importance of the
discount window has diminished considerably.
The amount of borrowing has declined dramati-
cally as fewer and fewer institutions have relied
on the window to meet short-term credit needs.
Consequently, the usefulness of the discount
window in smoothing reserve imbalances and
stabilizing interest rates may have been reduced.
In addition, changes in monetary policy operat-
ingproceduresandtheformalannouncementof
monetary policy decisions by the Federal
Reserve may have reduced the effectiveness of
discount rate changes in influencing market
interest rates and asset prices.
Inviewofthesedevelopments,itmaybetime
to rethink the role of the discount window and
to consider changes in its structure. One alter-
native to the traditional discount window is a
Lombard-typelendingfacilityinwhichdeposi-
tory institutions can borrow more freely than
under the current system but at a higher rate. A
number of central banks have recently adopted
such a system, including the European Central
Bank,theBankofCanada,theReserveBankof
Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zea-
land. The Federal Reserve recently employed a
similar structure in the design of its Century
Date Change Special Liquidity Facility.
While there appear to be good arguments in
favor of modernizing the discount mechanism,
a number of conceptual and practical issues
would have to be addressed before imple-
menting a Lombard-type lending facility. An
additional consideration, going forward, is the
projected reduction in the supply of Treasury
debt over the next few years. Ashrinking supply
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of open market operations in providing reserves
to the banking system and require the Federal
Reserve to place greater emphasis on the discount
window. Consequently, any redesign of the dis-
count window would need to address this issue.
This article analyzes the changing role of the
discount window in monetary policy and exam-
ines the case for discount window reform. The
first section discusses the traditional role of the
discount window and highlights its important
strengths and weaknesses. The second section
provides a brief history of discount window use
and examines the factors behind its diminished
role in recent years. The third section examines
how a Lombard-type lending facility would oper-
ateandidentifiessomeofthekeyissuesinvolved
in moving to a new discount window structure.
I. THE DISCOUNT WINDOW AND
MONETARY POLICY
The Federal Reserves discount window has
traditionally played a key role in monetary pol-
icy. Borrowing at the discount window serves
as an important source of short-term liquidity
for depository institutions and helps stabilize
short-terminterestrates.Changesinthediscount
rate can alter the incentives for institutions to bor-
row at the discount window and may also influ-
ence market interest rates and prices of other
financial assets. Over the years, both the struc-
tureofthediscountwindowanditsroleinmone-
tary policy have been subjects of considerable
debate.
The role of discount window borrowing
TheFederalReserveimplementsmonetarypol-
icy by influencing short-term interest rates through
its control over the supply of nonborrowed reserve
balancesheldbydepositoryinstitutions.Reserves
canbeadjustedeitherthroughopenmarketoper-
ationsthe purchase or sale of government secu-
ritiesor through the discount window. While
the Federal Reserve exercises direct control
over the amount of reserves provided through
open market operations, use of the discount
window depends on both the need and willing-
ness of depository institutions to borrow and on
terms and conditions for discount window
access set by the Federal Reserve.
Most institutions use discount window bor-
rowingtohelpmanagetheirreservebalancesin
the presence of uncertain payments and deposit
flows.
1Thus,aninstitutionfacingaprospective
overdraft in its reserve account at the end of a
day may seek funds either in the overnight
federal funds market or through the discount
window. Similarly, an institution may turn to
the discount window to help satisfy its reserve
requirements over a two-week reserve mainte-
nance period.
Whether a depository institution uses the dis-
countwindowdependspartlyonitswillingness
to borrow and partly on the relative cost of the
discount window as compared to alternative
funding sources. Some institutions choose not
to use the discount window, perhaps because
they see a stigma attached to such borrowing.
For example, they might feel that reliance on
discount window borrowing could be inter-
preted as a sign that an institution is having
unusual liquidity problems that cannot be met
through normal funding channels. Other insti-
tutions may use the window when the cost of
discount window credit is less than the cost of
alternative sources of funds, for example, when
the discount rate is less than the overnight fed-
eral funds rate.
The amount of discount window borrowing
also depends on terms and conditions set by the
Federal Reserve. Unlike many central banks,
the Federal Reserve has traditionally relied
heavily on regulation and administrative guide-
lines to control use of the discount window.
Manycentralbankscontrolaccessonlythrough
their discount or lending rate. Typically, this
6 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYrate is set as a penalty to the market rate, and
institutions are permitted to borrow freely at the
penalty rate as long as they have adequate collat-
eral. In contrast, the Federal Reserve has gener-
ally relied more on regulation than on price to
control the amount of borrowing. Currently, for
example, three basic principles guide use of the
discount window:
 The Federal Reserve provides credit at its
own discretion.
 Borrowing must be for an appropriate
reason.
 The borrower must seek other reasonably
available sources of funds before turning to
the discount window.
2
The reliance on administrative restrictions to
limit discount window borrowing has important
implications. Because of these restrictions, in
periods when overall liquidity needs are high,
some of these needs may not be satisfied
through the discount window. In this situation,
the overnight federal funds rate will tend to
exceed the discount rate, giving institutions an
increased incentive to borrow at the window.
Indeed, there has generally been a positive
spread between the federal funds rate and the
discount rate and a positive relationship
between the amount of borrowing and the size
of the spread (Chart 1).
3
The existence of a positive spread has two
further implications. First, there is typically a
subsidy, and sometimes a large subsidy, to
discountwindowborrowing.Second,thesensi-
tivity of borrowing to the spread helps cushion
the federal funds rate when there are unex-
pected changes in reserve demand or supply.
For example, if reserve supply is unexpectedly
low, depository institutions will have to scram-
ble for funding which will put upward pressure
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0on the federal funds rate. However, some of this
pressure will be relieved as the higher funds rate
causes institutions to seek cheaper funding at the
discount window. Similarly, if excess liquidity
places downward pressure on the federal funds
rate, institutions will rely less on discount win-
dow borrowing, which will help temper the
declineinthefundsrate.Thus,thepositiveinter-
est-sensitivity of borrowing can help reduce vol-
atility in the federal funds rate. Lower volatility
in the federal funds market may help the Federal
Reserve maintain its target for the federal funds
rateandmayalsocontributetolowervolatilityin
other interest rates.
The role of the discount rate
Discount rate changes also play an important
part in monetary policy. Decisions to approve
discount rate changes are made by the Board
of Governors, based on rate actions submitted
by the boards of directors of the regional Federal
ReserveBanks.
4TheBoardofGovernorsapproves
or denies these actions depending on its assess-
ment of whether overall economic conditions
warrant a change in the discount rate.
5
The impact of discount rate changes will depend
in large part on how monetary policy is imple-
mented. In recent years, the Federal Reserve has
conducted monetary policy by using open mar-
ket operations to maintain a target federal funds
rate. In this environment, discount rate changes
do not have a direct effect on market interest
rates but may influence the amount of discount
window borrowing.
6 For example, if the federal
funds rate target is not changed when the dis-
count rate is increased, the entire impact of the
discountratechangewillbefeltonborrowing.In
this situation, there is no upward pressure on the
federalfundsratebecauseadditionalreservesare
provided through open market operations in
ordertomaintainthefixedfundsratetarget.Bor-
rowing will be reduced, however, because with a
fixed funds rate target, the higher discount rate
reduces the incentive to borrow. Alternatively, if
the funds rate target is raised by the same
amount as the discount rate, not only is there no
independent effect of the discount rate on the
federalfundsrate,butthereisalsonoimpacton
borrowing because the spread is unchanged.
Even when the Federal Reserve employs a
federalfundsratetarget,however,discountrate
changes can still have an indirect effect on mar-
ket interest rates and asset prices if the discount
rate changes reveal new information to finan-
cial markets about current or future monetary
policy. For many years, the Federal Reserves
onlycontemporaneouspublicannouncementof
policy changes was in the form of a discount
rate change. Thus, discount rate announcements
frequently received considerable attention and
were sometimes accompanied by large move-
ments in market interest rates, exchange rates,
and other asset prices. In addition, since dis-
count rate changes tended to be relatively
infrequent and not readily reversed, they were
sometimesinterpretedasevidenceofadditional
policy actions in the future.
Discount window policy issues
Over the years, considerable controversy has
surrounded the discount mechanism. Most crit-
icism of the traditional structure has focused on
the existence of subsidies for discount window
borrowing and the use of nonprice means of
restricting access to the discount window. In
contrast, arguments supporting the traditional
system have emphasized the need to limit bor-
rowing to appropriate uses and the role of the
discount window in stabilizing interest rates.
As noted earlier, the discount rate has fre-
quently been lower than the federal funds rate.
Thus, institutions that borrow under these cir-
cumstances receive a subsidy that allows them
to receive lower funding costs than institutions
thatborrowinthefederalfundsmarket.Atvari-
ous times this subsidy has been quite large. For
example, in the 1970s and early 1980s, the dis-
8 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYcount rate was sometimes 500 basis points or
more below the daily average federal funds rate
(Chart 2). However, the size of the subsidy has
diminished in recent years as the spread between
the federal funds rate and the discount rate has
declined.
Discount window subsidies raise two general
policy concerns. One concern is about equity
between those institutions that borrow and
receive a subsidy and those that do not. Asecond
concern is that subsidies can distort deci-
sion-making and lead to an inefficient allocation
of resources as institutions undertake a higher
level of those activities favored by the subsidy.
A related criticism focuses on the use of
nonprice rationing of discount window credit.
Such a system may have substantial administra-
tive costs beyond the normal costs of valuing
collateral. Discount window administrators
must decide whether borrowing is appropriate
under existing guidelines and must also moni-
torcompliancewiththeregulations.Itmayalso
be difficult to administer these regulations in a
consistent manner over time or across district
Federal Reserve Banks.
7
In defense of the traditional discount window
structure, supporters have emphasized two
issues. First, relying entirely on price to ration
discount window credit may, at times, lead to
inappropriate use of the discount window. One
form of inappropriate behavior is the use of the
discount window to fund speculative activities.
During the late 1920s, for example, there was
concern that banks were borrowing at the dis-
count window to fund speculative activities in
the stock market. Another concern is that insti-
tutions might use the discount window to bor-
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-5row at a low rate and then turn around and loan
the funds in the federal funds market at a higher
rate. Asecond form of inappropriate behavior is
excessrelianceonthewindowasasourceoflon-
ger term credit. For example, since the discount
rate is an overnight rate, an institution might be
able to profit by rolling over its borrowing for an
extended period in order to fund higher yielding,
longer term assets. Regulation of discount win-
dowaccessmaybenecessarytoensurethatthese
activities do not occur.
Second, supporters of the traditional structure
have emphasized the importance of the discount
windowinstabilizingthemarketforreserves.As
noted in the previous section, a positive spread
between the federal funds rate and the discount
rate can help stabilize the federal funds rate by
cushioning the effects of unexpected changes in
reserve demand or supply. For example, deposi-
tory institutions can increase or reduce their dis-
count window borrowing to deal with a shortage
or surplus of reserves. In these circumstances,
discount window borrowing tends to alleviate
the pressures in the reserves market, which helps
stabilize the federal funds rate.
II. THE DECLINING ROLE OF THE
DISCOUNT WINDOW
Over the years, the role of the discount window
in monetary policy has evolved in response to
changesinFederalReserveoperatingprocedures,
depository institutions need and willingness to
borrow, and regulations governing discount win-
dow access. The importance of the window is
currently at its lowest point in many years as the
amount of borrowing has declined dramati-
cally and changes in operating procedures have
reducedthesignificanceofdiscountratechanges.
A brief history of the discount window
FromthefoundingoftheFederalReserveSys-
temuntiltheGreatDepression,thediscountwin-
dow was an important source of reserves for the
banking system, and discount rate changes
were a key component of monetary policy.
Indeed, at its peak usage in 1921, the discount
window provided 82 percent of bank reserves.
Even as open market operations began to play a
larger role in monetary policy in the latter part
of the 1920s, the proportion of reserves pro-
vided through the window never fell below 37
percent (Shull).
The role of the discount window diminished
dramaticallyduringthenexttwodecades.Inthe
1930s, the window was rarely used, in part,
because banks large holdings of excess reserves
reduced the need to borrow. Then, during and
immediately following the Second World War,
the Federal Reserves policy of supporting the
financing of government securities assured ade-
quate reserve availability so that banks did not
need to borrow.
Following the Treasury-Federal Reserve
Accord in 1951, normal monetary policy opera-
tions resumed, and banks returned to the dis-
count window. Although borrowing was limited
initially by banks use of their vast holding of
government securities to manage short-term
liquidity, increased use of the window became a
major concern of the Federal Reserve.
8 In 1953,
a System Committee on the Discount and Dis-
count Rate Mechanism was established to dis-
cuss the philosophy and effectiveness of the
discount mechanism. In 1955, recommenda-
tions of this committee led to the establishment
of a new set of General Principles to guide
discount window usage and revisions to Regu-
lation A, which governs discount window use.
The intent of these changes reflected a choice
to restrict activity at the discount window well
below even the lowest levels reached in the
1920s and to provide almost all reserves through
open market operations (Shull).
The most recent effort at comprehensive
reform of the discount mechanism began in
1965 with the establishment of a new System
10 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYCommitteeontheFundamentalReappraisalof
the Discount Mechanism. The tenor of this
reform effort was considerably different from
the 1953 study. Indeed, the view of this commit-
tee was that discount window use had become
too circumscribed by the 1955 revisions to Reg-
ulation A and that liberalized access to the dis-
count window was necessary. According to the
report of this committee,
The proposed redesign of the discount mecha-
nismhasasitschiefobjectiveincreaseduseofthe
discount window for the purpose of facilitating
short-term adjustments in bank reserve positions.
Amoreliberalandconvenientmechanismshould
enable individual member banks to adjust to
changes in fund availability in a more orderly
fashion and, in doing so, should lessen some of
thecausesofinstabilityinfinancialmarketswith-
out hampering overall monetary control.
Keyrecommendationsofthiscommitteeincluded
the establishment of more objective and uniform
terms and conditions for discounting across dis-
trict Reserve Banks and the creation of seasonal
credit and extended credit borrowing programs.
Recent behavior of discount window
borrowing
Since this last comprehensive effort at reform,
there have been relatively few changes in the
structure of the discount mechanism.
9 Over the
past three decades, however, there has been a
significant change in the behavior of discount
window borrowing (Chart 1). During the 1970s
and early 1980s, borrowing at the discount win-
dow exhibited typical cyclical variation. Bor-
rowing rose in periods of increasing interest
ratesasthespreadbetweenthefundsrateandthe
discount rate increased and fell as interest rates
and the spread declined. Since the mid-1980s,
however, discount window borrowing has expe-
rienced a strong secular decline. Indeed, average
weekly borrowing has fallen from around $1 bil-
lion in the early 1980s to less than $100 million
over the past decade.
10
Much of the change in borrowing behavior
can be traced to a decline in the number of
depository institutions using the discount win-
dow (Chart 3). In the early 1980s, on average,
over 200 institutions borrowed each week, with
as many as 550 borrowing in a single week. In
contrast, over the past four years, the average
number of institutions borrowing in a week has
fallen to about 25. Most of this decline in usage
can be traced to smaller institutions, those with
domestic deposits of less than $200 million.
From 1981 to 1985, about 180 small institu-
tions borrowed each week. Over the past four
years,however,onlyabout14smallinstitutions
borrowed each week.
Along with the decline in borrowing, the
traditional cyclical relationship between the
spreadandtheamountofborrowinghaslargely
disappeared in recent years. Indeed, since the
mid-1980s there is little apparent relationship
between the amount of borrowing and the
spread (Chart 1).
11 This development suggests
that the role of the discount window in stabiliz-
ing reserves and the federal funds rate, as dis-
cussed earlier, may have diminished as well.
Several reasons have been given for the
dramaticdeclineindiscountwindowuse.Per-
haps the most frequently cited explanation is
increased reluctance to borrow because of the
stigma associated with use of the discount
window (Clouse). The reduction in borrowing
coincided with increased banking problems
and failures during the late 1980s and early
1990s. According to this explanation, banks





ing may be the reduced economic incentive to
use the discount window because of a lower
spread. During the 1980s, the spread between
the funds rate and the discount rate averaged
about 130 basis points. In contrast, during the
ECONOMIC REVIEW l SECOND QUARTER 2000 111990s, the average spread was only 40 basis
points.
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A third possible explanation for the declining
use of the discount window focuses on changes
in reserve accounting regulations and reserve
management practices. Ashift from one-week to
two-week reserve maintenance periods in 1984
gave depository institutions more flexibility in
meeting reserve requirements, which may have
reduced the need to borrow at the discount win-
dow. Another accounting change that may have
reduced borrowing is the extension of the
reservecarryoverprovisionin1992.Thischange
allowed depository institutions to carry over a
greater part of a reserve surplus or deficiency
into the next maintenance period. By helping to
improve liquidity management, this change may
have enabled institutions to place less reliance
on the discount window. More recently, reserve
requirements have been moved from a contem-
poraneous to a lagged basis. This change may
have assisted institutions in managing their
reserve accounts and may also have made it
easier for open market operations to meet
reserveneeds.Depositoryinstitutionshavealso
increased their holdings of excess reserves in
recent years, which may have reduced the need
to borrow. Additionally, better reserve manage-
ment practices, such as improved real-time
information on reserve positions, may have
reducedtheneedtoturntothediscountwindow
to cover unexpected reserve deficiencies.
A fourth explanation for reduced borrowing
emphasizesthedevelopmentofalternativefund-
ing sources for depository institutions. For some
smaller institutions, the Federal Home Loan
Bank System has played a growing role in pro-
viding funding in recent years. The liberaliza-
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banks as well as thrift institutions to become
membersoftheHomeLoanBankSystem.Mem-
bers can borrow from Home Loan Banks to fund
short- term and intermediate-term liquidity needs.
While FHLB borrowing may be somewhat more
expensive than using the discount window, the
terms of this borrowing may better fit institutions
needs for short- to-intermediate-term funding.
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Finally,theongoingconsolidationofthebank-
ing industry has likely affected use of the dis-
count window. As a consequence of bank fail-
uresinthe1980sandearly1990sandanongoing
wave of bank mergers, there are far fewer bank-
ing organizations now than in the early 1980s. In
addition, the internalization of funding and
reserve management decisions associated with
this consolidation has likely resulted in signifi-
cant netting of liquidity needs within organiza-
tions and a reduced need to rely on the discount
window and other external sources of funding.
A lesser role for the discount rate
The influence of the discount rate as a policy
instrument also appears to have declined in
recent years. Discount rate changes now have
lesseffectontheamountofborrowingatthedis-
count window. Moreover, direct and indirect
effects of discount rate changes on interest rates
and asset prices appear to have been reduced as
well.
Two factors have reduced the impact of dis-
count rate changes on the amount of discount
window borrowing. One factor is the decreased
willingness to borrow and the associated decline
in the responsiveness of borrowing to the spread
between the funds rate and the discount rate. A
second factor is the relationship between the
federal funds rate target and the discount rate. In
recent years, changes in the discount rate have
generally been accompanied by changes in the
target federal funds rate. In fact, there have been
no independent changes in the discount rate since
the early 1980s.
15 Consequently, when the dis-
count rate has been changed, there has gener-
ally been little or no change in the spread and
thus little change in the incentive to borrow at
the discount window.
The impact of discount rate changes on inter-
est rates and asset prices also appears to have
been reduced by changes in the way monetary
policy is implemented. As discussed earlier,
the use of a federal funds rate target effectively
removes the ability of discount rate changes
to have an independent, direct effect on the
overnight federal funds rate. That is, with an
unchangedfundsratetarget,theeffectsofadis-
count rate change are routinely offset by open
market operations aimed at maintaining the funds
rate target.
Indirectorannouncementeffectsofdiscount
changes also appear to have been reduced by
changes in the way monetary policy is imple-
mented. Prior to 1994, announcements of dis-
count rate changes were often seen as signal-
ing major changes in monetary policy because
changes in the federal funds rate target were
not announced when they were made. Thus,
attention tended to focus on discount rate
changes and, indeed, several studies found
highly significant responses of market interest
rates, exchange rates, and other asset prices
to discount rate changes.
16 Since 1994, how-
ever, the Federal Open Market Committee has
announced all changes in the federal funds rate
target whether accompanied by a discount rate
change or not. Consequently, the information
contentofdiscountratechangeshaslikelybeen
reduced. In addition, recent studies suggest that
financialmarketshavebeenbetterabletoantic-
ipate monetary policy actions in recent years
(Roley and Sellon; Urich and Wachtel). Thus,
the effect of a policy action may be built into
market rates before the action is announced,
lowering the information value of the formal
announcementandreducingitsimpactoninter-
est rates and asset prices.
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ondiscountwindowborrowingandinterestrates
may have been reduced in recent years, the role
of discount rate recommendations by district
Reserve Banks continues to be an important part
ofthemonetarypolicyprocess.Suchrecommen-
dations provide the Board of Governors with an
independent assessment of the strength of eco-
nomic activity and an overall sense of the need
for a change in monetary policy.
III. MODERNIZING THE DISCOUNT
MECHANISM
As the importance of the discount window has
declinedinrecentyears,therehasbeenincreased
interest in modernizing the discount mechanism.
Many advocates for change would replace the
traditional discount window with a Lombard-
typelendingfacilitysimilartothatusedbyanum-
ber of other central banks. Although such facili-
ties appear to have a number of advantages over
thecurrentdiscountsystem,anumberofcomplex
implementation issues must be addressed before
the relative merits of the two systems can be
meaningfully compared. An additional com-
plication is the declining supply of Treasury
securities, which could have an important impact
on the role of the discount window and how it
should be structured.
Whats the alternative?
Many advocates for changing the structure of
the discount mechanism favor the use of a
Lombard-type lending facility. Such systems
differ from the traditional discount window in
two major respects. First, borrowing from the
facility is subject to minimal administrative
restrictions on eligibility. Generally, access is
available to any solvent financial institution that
holds reserves or settlement balances at the cen-
tral bank and can post acceptable collateral. Sec-
ond, the lending rate is set at a penalty to market
rates or, more commonly, to the central banks
target for the overnight interest rate. Thus, there
is normally an incentive to borrow only when
the overnight rate is sufficiently high relative to
the target rate to make the cost of Lombard lend-
ingattractive.Ineffect,theLombardfacilityacts
as a safety valve that damps large upward move-
ments in the overnight rate due to unexpected
liquidity pressures.
Lombard lending facilities have been tradi-
tionally used in monetary policy operations
in a number of European countries including
Germany,Switzerland,andAustria.
17Recently,
similar facilities have been adopted by the
newly created European Central Bank and by
central banks in a number of other countries
includingCanada,Australia,andNewZealand.
Moreover, the Federal Reserve implemented a
Lombard-type Special Lending Facility (SLF)
asatemporarymeasuretohelpdepositoryinsti-
tutions manage liquidity pressures during the
period surrounding the century date change.
The SLF had much fewer administrative restric-
tions than the traditional discount window. In
addition, while the basic discount rate contin-
ued to be set below the federal funds rate target,
the SLF lending rate was set at 150 basis points
above the funds rate target.
The role of a Lombard facility in managing
liquidity pressures depends on two structural
features: restrictions on access and the size of
themarginofthelendingrateovertheovernight
rate target. Generally speaking, with fewer restric-
tions on access, more depository institutions are
likely to be able and willing to use the facility.
Consequently, the easier the access, the more
likely it is that the Lombard lending rate will
serve as a cap on the overnight rate and so limit
largespikesintherateduetoliquiditypressures.
The size of the margin is also important
because it will determine how much borrowing
occurs and how much interest rate volatility is
reduced. If the margin between the lending rate
andthetargetrateisrelativelysmall,borrowing
is likely to be larger because it takes smaller
14 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYmovements in the overnight rate to reach the
lendingrateandinduceinstitutionstoborrow.At
the same time, the smaller margin will tend to
stabilizetheovernightratetoagreaterdegree.In
contrast, a wider margin will lead to larger inter-
est rate volatility and less borrowing.
Central banks that have adopted Lombard- type
facilities have generally made similar decisions
regarding access to the facility. Most have chosen
tohavefewformalrestrictionsonaccessbeyond
abasicsolvencyrequirement,restrictionofbor-
rowing to depository institutions, and adequate
collateralization. In contrast to the traditional
discount window, there are generally no require-
ments that institutions seek other sources of fund-
ing,andthepurposeoftheborrowingisnotscru-
tinized. In the case of the Federal Reserves SLF,
however, eligibility was based partly on formal
capital and supervisory standards and so may
have been somewhat more restrictive than simi-
lar facilities at other central banks.
There has been considerably less uniformity
among central banks in the size of the margin
between the lending rate and the target over-
nightrate.Somebanks,suchastheBankofCan-
ada, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, and the
Reserve Bank of Australia, have employed rela-
tively small margins of about 25 basis points. In
contrast, the European Central Bank has typi-
cally set a margin of about 100 basis points, and
the SLF used a 150-basis-point margin.
18
Comparing the alternatives
Adopting a Lombard-type facility could have a
number of advantages. Reduced regulation might
lead to lower costs of administering the discount
window,resultinginimprovedefficiency.Inaddi-
tion, under a Lombard system, there would likely
be a smaller subsidy to borrowing because there
would probably be a smaller margin between the
overnight rate and the lending rate as compared
to the traditional discount window. The subsidy
would not be entirely eliminated, however,
because institutions would only borrow when it
was profitable, that is, when the costs of funds
in the market exceeded the lending rate.
19 A
Lombard facility would also reduce interest rate
volatility in the overnight market by eliminat-
ing large spikes in the overnight rate. Thus, a
Lombard facility might actually do a better job
of stabilizing short-term interest rates than
the traditional discount window in light of the
reducedinterest-sensitivityofdiscountwindow
borrowing in recent years.
20
Atthesametime,anumberofdifficultimple-
mentation issues are involved with adopting
a Lombard facility. First, there is a tradeoff
between credit risk and interest rate stability in
thedesignofsuchafacility.Themoreaccessible
thefacility is, the more the lending rate is likely
toserveasanupperboundtotheovernightrate.
But, in this situation, the Federal Reserve is more
likely to be exposed to credit risk from unsound
institutions. On the other hand, the more access
is restricted, the less the facility can act as a
safety valve in alleviating liquidity pressures.
Striking the right balance may be difficult.
Asecondissueisthepotentialuseofthefacil-
ity by institutions to fund longer term invest-
ments. If the lending rate is below the cost of
alternative sources of funds, institutions may
turn to the facility for longer term borrowing
by renewing or rolling over their overnight
borrowing.Onewayofdealingwiththispotential
problem would be to introduce restrictions on
the frequency of borrowing. Another approach
would be to set a relatively high margin between
the lending rate and funds rate target to reduce
theincentivetousethelendingfacilityforlonger
term funding. Still another approach would be to
adopt an explicit term structure for lending rates
to eliminate this incentive.
Athird implementation issue is the size of the
margin between the lending rate and the funds
rate target. Anarrow margin will provide more
interest rate stability. However, market forces
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ing short-term interest rates as heavy reliance is
placed on the lending facility as a source of
reserves. In addition, too narrow a margin may
complicate the ability of open market operations
to maintain the target federal funds rate. Indeed,
with too small a margin it may be difficult to
maintain a target rate that is different from the
lending rate because any shortfall in liquidity is
likely to drive the overnight rate immediately to
the lending rate. These difficulties can be less-
ened with a wider margin, but at the expense of
higher interest rate volatility.
Afourthissueistheroleofthelendingrateasa
policy instrument under a Lombard system. As
long as monetary policy is implemented via a
federal funds rate target, changes in the lending
rate, like the traditional discount rate, are likely
to have limited policy significance. Indeed, if
there is a fixed margin between the lending rate
and the funds rate target, a change in one implies
achangeintheother,withnoindependentpolicy
significance. Alternatively, if the margin is vari-
able,thetworatescanbeadjustedindependently,
but the policy message resulting from this action
would have to be clearly articulated to the public.
In either case, the role of the regional banks in
making lending rate recommendations could be
maintained as under the current discount mecha-
nism. However, with a fixed margin, the separate
monetary policy responsibilities of the Board of
Governors for discount rate changes and the Fed-
eral Open Market Committee for open market
operations might need to be reexamined.
In several respects, a Lombard system would
appear to be an improvement on the current dis-
count window structure. A Lombard facility is
likely to result in lower administrative costs and
areducedsubsidyandmayprovidegreaterinter-
est rate stabilization than the current system. At
the same time, however, both the problems with
the current system and the gains of moving to a
Lombard system may be overstated, making a
decision between the two less clear-cut.
Indeed,thereareseveralreasonsforbelieving
that the current discount window is not broken
and does not need fixing. One interpretation of
the decline in discount window usage in recent
years is that institutions are reluctant to use the
window because of the stigma associated with
borrowing.MovingtoaLombardsystemmight
then be a way of removing the stigma and
improving the functioning of the lending facil-
ity. However, there is no guarantee that the
stigma would disappear without considerable
effort to educate depository institutions and
financial markets that use of the facility does
not reflect unfavorably on an institution.
Furthermore, rather than being a cause for
concern, much of the decline in borrowing
may actually be desirable if some longer term
borrowing that was formerly done at the dis-
countwindowisnowdonethroughotherfund-
ing sources. Moreover, if the discount window
were not functioning well as a safety valve for
short-term liquidity pressures, greater volatil-
ityinthefederalfundsratewouldbeexpected.
Yet, despite the decline in borrowing and even
with depository institutions now operating with
much lower reserve balances, there has been no
noticeable increase in interest rate volatility.
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Consequently,whilethediscountwindowmay
continue to play an important role in helping
individual institutions adjust to unexpected pay-
ments and deposit flows, it may now be less
important and less needed as a source of sys-
temic liquidity because of changes in reserve
accounting procedures and reserve manage-
ment practices. Thus, unless the current degree
of interest rate volatility is an important policy
concern, reducing volatility may not be a con-
vincing argument for adopting a Lombard
facility.
Finally, one advantage of a Lombard system
is potentially lower administrative costs and
subsidies. However, with the decline in dis-
count window use in recent years and with
consolidation in the banking system, some
16 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYreductions in administrative costs associated
with the discount window have already
occurred. It is not entirely clear what additional
cost savings might materialize under a Lombard
system. Furthermore, although discount window
subsidies may be esthetically and economically
unappealing, in recent years they have not been
very large due to the low level of borrowing and
smallspreadbetweenthediscountrateandfunds
rate.
22 Consequently, the benefits of adopting a
Lombard system to improve efficiency and
reduce subsidies may not be large.
Implications of a reduced supply of
Treasury debt
Ultimately, a decision on the structure of the
discount window may be heavily influenced by
the impact of a reduced supply of Treasury secu-
rities on the implementation of monetary policy.
A decreased supply of Treasury debt will com-
plicate the use of open market operations and
could expand the role of the discount window
beyond a safety valve to become a more impor-
tant source of reserves. If so, it will be important
to determine whether the traditional discount
window, a Lombard facility, or another structure
would be best suited to this expanded role.
The onset of surpluses in the federal budget
has led to projections of a significant decrease in
or elimination of the government debt over the
next decade. This development could affect the
implementation of monetary policy through the
use of open market operations. Currently, the
FederalReserveusesopenmarketpurchasesand
sales of government securities as its principal
method of adjusting reserves to maintain a target
federal funds rate. Asmaller supply of securities
willmakeitmoredifficulttocarryoutopenmar-
ket operations. An additional complication is
that the amount of securities that the Federal
Reserve purchases is likely to increase over time
as a growing demand for currency requires an
offsetting increase in reserves.
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One possible response to this development is
to expand the range of assets that the Federal
Reserve purchases in its open market opera-
tions to include securities of government agen-
cies and even private debt. Another possibility
is to consider expanding the amount of reserves
that are provided through the discount mecha-
nism so that the discount window once again
becomes a significant and permanent source of
reserves.
If the role of the discount mechanism is to be
expanded, a key question is whether the tradi-
tional discount window structure, a Lombard
facility, or a different structure would be best
suitedforthistask.Boththetraditionaldiscount
structure and a Lombard system appear to have
limitations that may reduce their usefulness. In
the case of the traditional discount window,
greater use of the facility would require a
greater willingness to borrow by depository
institutions and might also require a significant
increase in the funds rate-discount rate spread
to increase the attractiveness of borrowing.
However, increased borrowing and a larger
spread would also increase the amount of sub-
sidy to depository institutions that use the win-
dow. On the other hand, Lombard lending
facilities have typically been used only as a
safety valve or marginal source of reserves and
not as a large or permanent source of reserves.
Given these limitations, additional study may
be needed to determine the best design for the
discount mechanism in an era of a declining
supply of Treasury debt.
IV.SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
For many years, the discount window has
played an important role in monetary policy.
Discount window borrowing has provided a
mechanism for individual depository institu-
tions to adjust to unexpected deposit and pay-
ments flows and so has helped stabilize short-
term interest rates. In addition, changes in the
discount rate have influenced depository insti-
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also affected interest rates and prices of other
financial assets.
In recent years, however, the role of the dis-
count window has diminished considerably. Very
few institutions now use the window as a means
of adjusting to liquidity needs, and the signifi-
cance of discount rate changes has been reduced
by changes in monetary policy procedures.
In light of these developments, it may be appro-
priate to consider steps to reform the discount
mechanism. One alternative to the traditional
discount window structure is a Lombard-type
lending facility. Anumber of other central banks
have recently adopted Lombard systems. As
compared to the traditional discount window, a
Lombard system places greater weight on price
than on regulation and administration to ration
central bank credit. In principle, such an
approach could provide a safety valve for
depository institutions experiencing liquidity
pressures while reducing administrative costs
and subsidies associated with the traditional
discount window. In practice, however, the
choice may not be so clear-cut. There are a
number of complex issues involved in imple-
menting a Lombard system, and the benefits of
change may not significantly exceed the costs.
More important, the declining supply of Trea-
sury securities in coming years may require
changes in monetary policy operations and so
influencethechoiceofadiscountmechanism.
ENDNOTES
1 This article focuses on routine, short-term borrowing for
liquidity reasons that is done under the Adjustment Credit
program. In addition, some depository institutions may bor-
row under the Seasonal Credit or Extended Credit programs.
For more information on these programs, see Board of Gov-
ernors.
2 For more details on regulations and administrative guide-
lines governing the discount window, see Board of Gover-
nors.
3 Without administrative restrictions and with no stigma
attached to the use of the discount window, the discount rate
would tend to serve as a cap for the overnight federal funds
rate since there would be no reason or incentive to borrow at
a rate higher than the discount rate.
4 For a more detailed discussion of the role of discount rate
recommendations in monetary policy, see Tootell.
5Strictlyspeaking,eachdistrictReserveBankestablishesits
owndiscountratesubjecttoreviewanddeterminationbythe
Board of Governors. In practice, district banks usually
charge a uniform rate. Thus, when the Board of Governors
approves a rate change for an individual Reserve Bank or
group of banks, the remaining banks adopt the new rate
within a few days.
6 In contrast, if the Federal Reserve implements policy by
targeting nonborrowed reserves, as was the case from 1979
to 1982, or borrowed reserves as was the case from 1982 to
1988, the discount rate can play a more prominent role. In
these circumstances, changes in the discount rate can have
a direct effect on the overnight federal funds rate. For a fur-
therdiscussionoftheimpactofdiscountratechangesunder
alternative operating procedures, see Sellon.
7 A third criticism of the current structure of the discount
window is that, under operating procedures designed to
control money growth, it may impede the Federal
Reserves ability to control the money supply. For exam-
ple, if the Federal Reserve removes reserves through open
market operations in order to reduce money growth, the
resulting increase in the federal funds rate, with a fixed dis-
count rate, will lead to greater borrowing and somewhat
faster reserve and money growth. This criticism is espe-
cially relevant when the Federal Reserve uses a reserve
operating procedure to attempt to control money growth
but is not relevant under the current federal funds rate tar-
geting procedures. For more discussion of this issue, see
Sellon.
8 With the resumption in use of the discount window in the
1950s, discount rate changes became more frequent
(Thornton).
9 One potentially important change that turned out to have
limited impact was the Depository Institutions Deregula-
tion and Monetary Control Act of 1980. This legislation
extended reserve requirements to all depository institu-
tions, including thrift institutions and credit unions, and
also made them eligible to borrow from the discount win-
18 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYdow. However, revisions to Regulation A to implement this
legislation required these institutions to rely on traditional
sources of liquidity before approaching the discount win-
dow. Consequently, despite the expansion of eligible institu-
tions, there was not a significant increase in discount
window usage. Other changes in the discount mechanism in
recent years were the establishment of a temporary discount
rate surcharge in 1980-81, the introduction of market-related
discount rates on seasonal and extended credit in the early
1990s, and restrictions on availability of discount window
creditmandatedbytheFDICImprovementAct(FDICIA)of
1991.
10 Borrowing was somewhat elevated in the last quarter of
1999duetoliquidityconcernssurroundingtheCenturyDate
Change. These higher levels do not appear to have persisted
in the first part of this year.
11 Statistical tests confirm the breakdown of the relationship
between the amount of borrowing and the spread. For exam-
ple, in a linear regression of borrowing on the spread esti-
matedovertheperiodfrom1971to1984,thereisalargeand
statistically significant positive effect of the spread on bor-
rowing. In contrast, when this relationship is estimated after
1984, the effect of the spread on borrowing becomes smaller
and statistically insignificant. See, for example, the discus-
sion in Clouse.
12 While this factor may have been important previously,
particularly during the early 1990s, it is not entirely clear
why this problem would continue to exist in light of the
strong condition of the banking industry over the past few
years.
13Since the true cost of using the discount window probably
exceeds the discount rate because of nonprice restrictions,
for many institutions the discount rate may have effectively
been a penalty rate in recent years.
14 Alternatively, it may actually be the case that FHLB bor-
rowing is less expensive than the discount window when the
administrative burden of the discount window is factored
into its cost.
15 In the early 1990s, both the federal funds target and dis-
count rate were reduced on several occasions. In a few
instances, the discount rate was lowered by more than the
funds rate target, which increased the spread between the
two. Generally speaking, the larger change in the discount
rate on these occasions was primarily designed to restore the
spread to its previous level after the funds target had been
lowered previously without a change in the discount rate.
Since 1994, discount rate changes have been accompanied
by equal changes in the funds rate target.
16 See Thornton for a discussion of the information content
of discount rate announcements and references to other
studies.
17 In this article, the terms Lombard-type facility and
Lombard facility are used generically to categorize simi-
lar facilities that are modeled along the lines of traditional
LombardfacilitiesemployedbytheDeutscheBundesbank,
theSwissNationalBank,andtheNationalBankofAustria.
18 In fact, most Lombard-type lending facilities are cou-
pled with a deposit facility where institutions can obtain
interestfromthecentralbankonexcessreservesandsettle-
ment balances. The lending rate and the deposit rate serve
as upper and lower bounds for the overnight rate and a tar-
get for the overnight rate is set within this band or corridor.
A number of countries, including Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand, have chosen a relatively narrow 50-basis-
point corridor. In contrast, the European Central Bank has
generally set a band of 200 basis points. When the ECB
came into existence, the band between the lending rate and
the deposit rate was initially set at 50 basis points as a tran-
sition measure. Then the band was widened to 250 basis
points. More recently, the band has been 200 basis points.
It should be noted that the ECB does not have a target for
the overnight rate. Rather, in conducting its open market
operations it establishes either a fixed rate for repurchase
agreements or a minimum bid rate for variable-rate repos.
Changes in these rates serve to indicate changes in the
stance of monetary policy.
19Thesizeofthesubsidywouldalsodependontheamount
borrowed. It is difficult to say whether borrowing would be
higher under a Lombard-type system than the current dis-
count window. Partly this would depend on the size of the
margin between the lending rate and the target overnight
rate, with a smaller margin likely to induce more borrow-
ing. The amount of borrowing might be higher under a
Lombard-typefacilityifinstitutionsfeelthatthereislessof
a stigma attached to this borrowing than to use of the tradi-
tional discount window.
20 This issue is significantly more complicated if the com-
parison is made between a Lombard facility and the tradi-
tional discount window where borrowing is sensitive to the
spread between the federal funds rate and the discount rate.
TheLombardfacilityreducesvolatilityonlybyeliminating
large upward spikes. The traditional mechanism does not
preventspikes,butrathersmoothesratemovementsinboth
an upward and downward direction. That is, a higher or
lowerfundsrateelicitsmoreorlessborrowing,whichtends
to reduce rate volatility.
21 For a more detained discussion of the decline in reserve
balances in recent years and the implications for interest
rate volatility, see Sellon and Weiner.
ECONOMIC REVIEW l SECOND QUARTER 2000 1922 Subsidies were also reduced when the rate on seasonal
creditwaschangedfromafixedratetoamarket-relatedrate.
23 An increase in the demand for currency by the public
drains reserves from depository institutions requiring an off-
setting purchase of securities and increase in reserves to
maintain a given interest rate target. Currency demand has
grownstronglyinrecentyearsduetodomesticandinterna-
tional factors and is likely to continue to increase unless
there is a more rapid adoption of retail electronic payments
that reduces the need for currency.
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